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Miller v Alabama and (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation 
Elizabeth S. Scott∗ 
This is an exciting period of change in youth crime regulation and the Supreme Court’s 
three Eighth Amendment opinions rejecting the constitutionality of harsh sentences imposed on 
juvenile offenders are a big part of the excitement. Three times in seven years, the Court has 
considered questions relating to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.  First in 2005 in Roper v 
Simmons,1 the Court prohibited the death penalty for a crime committed by a juvenile offender. 
In 2010, in Graham v. Florida,2 the Court struck down the sentence of Life without Parole 
(LWOP) for non-homicide offenses. Finally in 2012, in Miller v. Alabama3 the Court held that a 
statute that mandated the sentence of LWOP for homicide amounted to Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment when applied to a juvenile offender. The Supreme Court indeed seems to be on a 
roll.4  
This morning I want to explore the importance of these Eighth Amendment cases, 
particularly Miller, mostly in terms of their meaning for juvenile crime regulation. The Court 
tells us in emphatic terms that young offenders, because they are developmentally immature, are 
less culpable than their adult counterparts and more likely to reform—and that these differences 
                                                 
∗
 Harold R. Medina Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The author presented this essay as a keynote address 
at a symposium conference sponsored by the Journal at the University of Minnesota Law School on October 4, 
2012. Thanks to Annie Steinberg  for research assistance and to Jamie Buskirk and the other Journal editors for 
organizing the symposium.  
1
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2
 Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). 
3
 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
4
 The Court also held in 2011 that in evaluating whether the failure of a law enforcement officer to give Miranda 
warnings to a youth he was questioning resulted in exclusion of the youth’s statement, the age of a youth is relevant 
to the determination of whether he understood that he was free to leave. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 
(2011). 
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are important to the legal response to juvenile crime.5 This message represents a way of thinking 
about youth crime that has begun to take hold in first decade of 21st century—partly in response 
to the Court’s opinions but also independently for reasons I will explain. Contemporary 
lawmakers increasingly have turned to developmental science for guidance in formulating justice 
policies,  recognizing that both fairness and social welfare goals are promoted by differential 
treatment of adolescent offenders.  
But this approach is very different from that of the 1990s, a period when young criminals 
were seen as vicious “superpredators”6 and a series of moral panics swept the country resulting 
in the transformation of traditional juvenile justice policies. In this hostile climate, the goals of 
punishing young offenders and protecting the public trumped other considerations and the 
importance of differences between juvenile and adult offenders was either ignored or denied.  
 Although we might be happy put it behind us, I want to begin my talk by focusing on 
that period of recent history—hence my title -- The past and future of juvenile crime regulation. 
My suggestion is that we can learn useful lessons if we understand the dynamics of moral panic 
decisionmaking and compare it to the scientifically-based and more deliberative approach to 
juvenile crime regulation that the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed and that modern 
lawmakers are at least tentatively beginning to adopt.  
My plan is to tell the story of what has been a dramatic period in juvenile justice policy 
over the past generation (way too dramatic sometimes), focusing on factors that have contributed 
to a changing legal environment and highlighting the differences between the approach to 
                                                 
5
 See discussion infra t.a.n 37 to 41 . 
6
 The term ‘superpredator’ was coined by John DiIullio, The Coming of the Superpredators, WEEKLY STANDARD, . 
Nov. 27, 1995, who sounded the alarm about a coming wave of violent dangerous youths growing up in moral 
poverty. 
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lawmaking in this realm in the late 20th century and more recently. Finally I will propose that it 
may be possible to adopt strategies to limit the harmful impact of moral panics that inevitably 
will arise in the future—and to reinforce the current policy direction.  
The Moral Panics of the 1990s 
Youth crime was a hot political issue in the 1990s.  It is fair to say that the concern began 
as a response to a threat that warranted attention. Violent juvenile crime, particularly homicide, 
increased dramatically in the late 1980s.7  The public reacted with alarm, exacerbated by a 
widespread perception that the juvenile justice system was ineffective in dealing with the 
problem.8  Not surprisingly politicians responded to the public’s concern and, in less than a 
generation, almost every state changed its laws to make it easier to prosecute and punish 
juveniles as adults.9 This happened through several types of legal reforms. The age of transfer to 
criminal court was lowered and the range of transfer-eligible offenses expanded, while, under 
legislative waiver statutes, youths charged with particular offenses were categorically excluded 
from juvenile court jurisdiction. Many states shifted the authority to make jurisdictional 
decisions from judges to prosecutors.10 In the juvenile system, dispositions got harsher and the 
use of incarceration increased substantially.11 This is a familiar story that need not be repeated, 
                                                 
7
 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, JUVENILE ARREST 
RATE TRENDS, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (“The juvenile 
arrest rate for all offenses reached its highest level in the last two decades in 1996, and then declined 36% by 
2009.”) 
8
 Jane B. Sprott, Understanding Public Opposition to a Separate Juvenile System, 44 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 399 
(2001)(survey finding support for view that juvenile system’s laxness  encouraged youth crime).    
9
 ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 4 (2008). 
10
 National Center for Juvenile Justice, National Overviews, available at http:www.ncjj.org; Patricia Torbet, State 
Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime, OJJDP Research Report (1996), available at  
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/statresp.pdf [hereinafter State Responses]. 
11
 See Steve Aos, The Juvenile Justice System in Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost-
Effectiveness, Wash. State Instit.for Pub. Pol. Oct. 2002, at 3, available at 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=02-10-1201(describing increased use of incarceration in Washington 
state). 
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but suffice to say that, during this period, a legal regime that had viewed most teenage crime as 
the product of youthful immaturity was transformed into one that often was ready to ignore 
differences between young offenders and their adult counterparts as irrelevant to criminal 
punishment.  
Supporters defended these changes as simply a coherent policy response to a new 
generation of violent juveniles-- a recognition that the traditional regime was outmoded and 
unable to protect the public.12 But even when the reforms were motivated by legitimate concerns, 
the process often had the hallmarks of a moral panic—a dynamic that has long interested 
sociologists,13 in which the media, politicians and the public interact in a pattern of escalating 
alarm in response to a perceived social threat. The danger that sparks a moral panic is often real- 
think about child sexual abuse.14 But what distinguishes a moral panic from a straightforward 
response to a pressing social problem is the gap between the perception of the severity of the 
threat and the reality.15  
This certainly describes the response to juvenile crime in the 1990s. Media coverage of 
violent youth crime increased dramatically during this period. Stories about high profile 
                                                 
12
 Governor John Engler of Michigan suggested that the juvenile justice system was designed for youths stealing 
hubcaps in an earlier era—and was inadequate to deal with violent modern youths. See New Juvenile Code would 
Come Down Hard on Teens, Luddington Daily News, January 15, 1996, available at 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19950113&id=ODRQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UFUDAAAAIBAJ&p
g=5523,814670. 
13
 Stanley Cohen coined the term “moral panic,” and was probably the first sociologist to study and analyze moral 
panics in a study of British “mods” and “rockers” published in 1972. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL 
PANICS (3RD ED. 2002). See also ERICH GOODE AND NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE (2ND ED. 2009) (offering  comprehensive theoretical and empirical treatment).  
14
 The molesting and killing of a 7 year old New Jersey child, Megan Kanka, by a neighbor led states across the 
country to pass “Megan’s laws,” mandating registration of sex offenders. Kimberley McLarin, Trenton Races to 
Pass Bills on Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994 (law passed 30 days after Megan’s death). Earlier, charges of 
satanic sexual abuse against employees and the owner of day care center generated alarm across the country. See 
Margaret Talbot, The Devil in the Nursery, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 7, 2001 available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2001/the_devil_in_the_nursery (describing hysteria in obituary for 
accused worker).  
15
 See GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 13, at 35-37 (describing exaggeration of threat as element of moral 
panic). 
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crimes—school shootings and gang killings of innocent bystanders—generated public outrage 
and fear, and particular crimes often came to represent a larger threat.16 Prosecutors and 
politicians, eager to demonstrate their concern for victims and for public safety, promised 
punishment of offenders and protection from young criminals generally. Legislation often 
followed— effectively institutionalizing the moral panic.  
A striking feature of this story is the dramatic change in the way that young offenders 
were depicted.  In the somewhat idealized rhetoric of the traditional juvenile court, delinquents 
were “children,” immature youths who had gone astray.17  By the mid-1990s, they had become 
“superpredators,” remorseless creatures who roamed in gangs, maiming and killing without 
moral compunction, and considering no consequences other than their own evil gratification. 
Criminologist John DuIllio, who coined the term, also predicted that the problem would only get 
worse when the large birth cohort of the early 1990s reached adolescence in the early 21st 
century.18 The superpredator label and stereotype was picked up by politicians and the media19—
as was the sense of urgency that something must be done to protect the public from the threat. 
Young offenders were no longer wayward youths in the public imagination—they had become 
the enemy of society. This characterization may have been easier for many Americans to accept 
                                                 
16
 See discussion of Columbine High School shootings, infra t.a.n. 25 to 27.  
17
 See Justine Wise Polier, Dissenting View, in JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT: STANDARDS RELATING TO 
NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (1982). 
18
 See DiIullio, supra note 6 (describing superpredators and predicting a “coming”wave). 
19
 See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 4-5  (1998) (citing Congressman Bill McCollum, Chair of 
the House Subcommittee on Crime, “Brace yourself for the coming generation of superpredators.”). Peter Annin, 
“Superpredators” Arrive: Should we Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids, NEWSEEK, Jan. 22, 1997, at 57; Jim 
Atkinson, Thrill Killers, TEXAS MONTHLY 126, 126-33 (“The culprits…are..a new breed of street criminals known 
as superpredators..[their crimes are as savage as they are pointless.]. Lynne Abraham, Philadelphia District Attorney 
opined “We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life.” Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad 
News: A Teenage Time Bomb at 52, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996.   
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because it was assumed that teenage offenders were minority youths—since membership in 
juvenile gangs, the focus of media attention, was often limited by race and ethnicity.20  
In this climate, vivid images of scary teenage criminals captured the public imagination, 
distorting perceptions about the threat of juvenile crime. Surveys showed that the public thought 
that most violent crime was committed by juveniles, while in fact, they were responsible for 
about 15%.21 The public also thought juvenile crime was on the rise after many years of steady 
decline.22 Politicians fueled these misperceptions. In 2000, the District Attorney of Ventura 
County, California, published an op ed supporting Proposition 21—an initiative expanding the 
net of criminal court jurisdiction over juveniles. He described gang violence as a growing 
problem and “the most alarming of all crime trends”23 At the time gang violence had been 
declining for 6 years and was lower than it had been in decades.24  
The 1999 school shootings Columbine High School in Colorado provides an example of 
the dynamic of a moral panic. Understandably the horrific incident was the focus of massive 
media attention. Cover stories in national magazines pondered the meaning of the killings and 
                                                 
20
 Most gangs were ethnically based and non-white. Two African American gangs in Los Angeles, the Crips and the 
Bloods, gained notoriety in the 1980s, giving the city the dubious distinction of being known as the “gang capital of 
the nation.” Robert Conot, L.A. Gangs: Our City, Their Turf, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22 1987, at 1. One commentator 
described gangs as “a breakdown of the moral order, an evil in which racial or ethnic ties have been perverted for 
criminal gain.” Jeffrey Mayer, Individual Moral Responsibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 943, 945 (1993). 
21
 A 1996 survey of 1,000 likely California voters found that 60 percent of respondents believed that juveniles were 
responsible for most violent crime; in reality, only 14% of arrests for violent crimes involved juveniles. See Lori 
Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance: Youth, Race, and Crime in the News, Building Blocks for Youth, 2001, 
3-4, 40 n 10, available at www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/offbalance.pdf (describing results of study). 
22
 In a 1998 study of 2,000 adults, 62% of respondents believed youth crime was on the rise, while the National 
Crime Victimization Survey for that year revealed youth crime to be at its lowest rate in the 25 year history of the 
survey.  See Justice Policy Institute, Schools and Suspensions: Self-Reported Crime and the Growing use of 
Suspensions, Sep. 1, 2001, available at www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/jpi/sss.pdf. A 2000 California poll found that a 
majority of voters thought youth crime was increasing- although the crime rate had decreased steadily for at least 
five years. Dorfman & Schiraldi, id., at 3. 
23
 SCOTT &STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 107 n 69. 
24
 Id.  
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the dangers that children faced in school; some described as an “epidemic” of school violence.25 
In fact, school shootings have always been extremely rare events (children face a greater risk of 
being struck by lightning). And they were even rarer in the late 1990s than a decade earlier.26 
Nonetheless, in the wake of Columbine, legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict Zero 
Tolerance laws- making it a crime to threaten violence in school.27   
The upshot is that by the beginning of the 21st century, traditional juvenile crime policy 
had been largely dismantled. Critics, both academics like Barry Feld and myself, and advocates 
like Bob Schwartz & Marsha Levick, challenged the move to criminalization as unfair to kids 
and ineffective at preventing crime, and observed that the burden of punitive laws fell 
disproportionally on minority youths—but these arguments gained little traction in the political 
arena in the 1990s. 
Dissipation of the Moral Panics 
In the past decade, the moral panics have gradually subsided and juvenile crime has faded 
as a hot political issue. Many lawmakers and politicians-- from the Supreme Court to big city 
mayors-- appear ready to rethink the punitive approach of the 1990s, and recent surveys indicate 
strong public support for a rehabilitative approach to teenage crime.28  Public safety is still 
                                                 
25In the wake of the Columbine shooting, one reporter described a trend of “alienated youths” against a backdrop of 
“violent and nihilistic” popular culture. Timothy Egan, Terror in Littleton: Violence by Youths: Looking for 
Answers, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 22, 1999; See also, Lauren Terrazzano, The Colorado Tragedy: Shooting 
Upsets Notion of Suburban Sanctuary: Local Anxiety in Wake of Colorado Massacre, NEWSDAY, Apr. 22, 1999. For 
general discussion of the exaggerated perceptions of the threat of school violence, see DEWEY CORNELL, SCHOOL 
VIOLENCE: FEAR VERSUS FACTS, 11-23 (2006).  
26
  GOODE & BEN YEHUDA, supra note 13 at 46 (describing declining incidence). 
27
 These laws were enforced rigidly sometimes against very young children. See Joan Wasser, Zeroing in on Zero 
Tolerance, 15 J.L.& POLITICS 747, 747-59 (1999). 
28
 Daniel Nagin, Alex Piquero, Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Public Preferences for Rehabilitation versus 
Incarceration of Young Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation Study, 5 J. CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. 
POLICY 627 (2006)(study showing greater willingness to pay for rehabilitation than incarceration where both were 
described as equally effective at reducing crime) 
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important, of course and it would be an exaggeration to report a widespread repudiation of the 
punitive policies. But it does seem that paternalism toward young offenders has begun to 
reemerge in updated form in the early 21st century.    
How can we explain the change in attitudes?  Certainly it is important that juvenile crime 
rates declined and that the predicted wave of superpredators never materialized.29 After a decade 
or so, politicians and the public seemed to realize that the threat of juvenile crime was not as 
great as it had appeared to be in the 1990s. We might also speculate that another threat--Islamic 
terrorists—supplanted teenage criminals as the most feared enemies of society. At a more 
practical level, state governments began to recognize the high cost of incarceration-based 
policies, particularly as tax revenues fell in the recession. Just as important, a growing body of 
research indicated that recidivism rates were depressingly high for youths released from 
incarceration, while some community-based correctional programs showed better outcomes at a 
fraction of the cost.30   
A more intangible influence on law and policy in recent years has been the view that 
imposing harsh criminal punishment on young offenders violates basic notions of fairness at the 
heart of any legitimate justice system. This, of course is the essence of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions—and the Court’s powerful message has resonated through the justice system—
                                                 
29
 Violent juvenile crime rates began a steady decade-long decline in 1994; rates declined for other crimes shortly 
thereafter. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, 
JUVENILE ARREST RATE TRENDS, available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 
(“The juvenile arrest rate for all offenses reached its highest level in the last two decades in 1996, and then declined 
36% by 2009.”); Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, OJJDP Juv. Just. Bulletin, Dec. 2009, available at 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf (describing declining rates for specific offenses).  
30
 See discussion, t.a.n. 62 to 64 infra.(discussing states’ decisions to close institutions to shift resources to more 
effective community programs).   
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challenging a regime that ignored differences between juveniles and adults.31 But these ideas 
were already beginning to have an influence in the political arena.  
Characterizing Contemporary Young Offenders 
The change in attitudes about juvenile crime is most evident in the way that young 
offenders are characterized today in political and legal settings. Perhaps somewhere out there, an 
angry politician is talking about vicious young superpredators—but I don’t know where. Instead, 
Supreme Court justices, governors, legislators, media types and journalists describe juvenile 
offenders as youths whose crimes are a product of developmental immaturity and whose 
maturity into non-criminal adulthood is a reasonable policy goal.  
To some extent this change of heart may not be so surprising. Paternalistic attitudes about  
children and youth were submerged in the 1990s – but they are deeply embedded in our 
culture—and with the reduced focus on the threat of juvenile crime, they have reemerged. But 
today’s teenage offenders are less likely to be depicted as innocent children than they were a few 
decades ago. Instead, a more sophisticated account of the differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders—informed by scientific knowledge about adolescence—particularly developmental 
brain research. 
Stephen Morse in his symposium article discusses this neuroscience research and how it 
might inform our understanding of juvenile offending.32  What I would note is simply the level 
                                                 
31
 Another fairness concern has contributed to uneasiness with the punitive regime that took shape in the 1990s—
that minority youths disproportionately were adjudicated as adults and received harsh sentences. At least one recent 
legislative reform was explicitly motivated by this concern; in 2005, Illinois repealed a statute mandating transfer of 
15 year olds who sold drugs near a school or housing project when it became clear that those charged under the 
statute were overwhelmingly minority youths. National Juvenile Defender Center, “2005 State Juvenile Justice 
Legislation,” November 2005, at http://njdc.info/publications.php. 
32
 Stephen J. Morse, "Brain Overclaim Syndrome Redux: More Cognitive Jurotherapy Is Indicated" Jl. CITE when 
available (2012).  
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of interest in “the teenage brain” among lawmakers, the media and the public in recent years.33 
Policymakers at all levels have invoked adolescent brain research in rationalizing legal reforms 
that deal more leniently with juveniles-- accepting the view that immature brain functioning 
contributes to adolescents’ decisions to get involved in criminal activity.34 For reasons that are 
unclear, many observers seem to find the neuroscience evidence more compelling than the 
extensive body of behavioral research that is largely simply confirmed by the brain studies.35 
Whether the interest in developmental neuroscience on the part of the public and politicians 
played a causal role in creating more benign attitudes toward young offenders is unclear but it 
certainly has strongly reinforced the contemporary view that much adolescent criminal activity is 
driven by transient developmental immaturity—and that adult criminal punishment may not be 
appropriate. 
Juvenile Offenders in the Supreme Court  
The three recent Supreme Court Eighth Amendment opinions were decided against this 
backdrop of changing attitudes and all draw on developmental research in rejecting harsh 
sentences as excessive for juvenile offenders. Roper v. Simmons in 2005 cited behavioral 
research in holding the death penalty unconstitutional for a crime committed by a juvenile, while 
Graham v. Florida and Miller also invoked neuroscience research in striking down LWOP 
                                                 
33
 Sharon Begley, Getting Inside a Teenage Brain, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2000, at 58; Claudia Wallis, What Makes 
Teens Tick? TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56; Malcolm Ritter, Experts Link Teen Brains’ Immaturity, Crime USA TODAY, 
Dec. 2, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2007-12-02-teenbrains_N.htm.  
34
 See, e.g. t.a.n. 56  infra. For a discussion of the reforms, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 9, 96-99. 
35
 Observing that the Court is more willing to accept behavioral research when accompanied by neuroscience 
research, Laurence Steinberg describes a portion of Seth Waxman’s oral argument for the abolition of the juvenile 
death penalty in Roper. Prompted by Justice Breyer’s inquisition into whether or not the current research is 
something more than “every parent already knows,” Waxman responded, “I’m not just talking about social science 
here, but the important neurobiological science.” Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain 
Development Inform Public Policy? 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 739, 742 (2009). 
11 
 
sentences.36 Each of these decisions rests primarily on a developmentally informed 
proportionality analysis. First, the Court emphasized that juveniles have “greater prospects for 
reform”37 than do adults because most teenage offending is the product of “transitory” 
developmental influences.38 But the heart of the Court’s proportionality analysis was its 
discussion of three distinctive aspects of adolescence that mitigate the culpability of young 
offenders. First adolescents have diminished decisionmaking capacity due to their impulsivity, 
proclivity for risktaking and deficiency in foreseeing consequences.39 Second, they are 
vulnerable to negative external pressures from peers and family to a greater extent than adults 
and they are less able than adults to escape their social context. 40And third, an adolescent’s 
character is unformed-- his criminal acts are less likely than an adult’s to be evidence of 
irretrievable depravity.41  
On first glance, Miller appears more modest in its reach than the two earlier decisions 
that imposed categorical bans on the challenged sentences for juveniles.  Miller simply prohibits 
a mandatory sentence of LWOP for homicide. In theory, as long as the youth is permitted to 
introduce mitigating evidence of his immaturity and circumstances, he could be subject to the 
sentence—even a youth like Kuntrell Jackson,whose case was joined with Miller’s, who was 
                                                 
36
 The Court emphasized that the tendency of adolescents to get involved in risky behavior often results in 
“impetuous and ill-considered decisions.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; See also, Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026-27 (citing 
brain research). In Miller, the Court noted that brain development involved in behavioral control continues to mature 
through late adolescence and explained, “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds—for example, in parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control.” Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (internal quotations omitted). 
37
 Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2464.  
38
 Id. at 2465.  
39
 Graham, 130 S.Ct., at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S., at 569; Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
40
 Roper, 543 U.S., at 569; Graham, 130 S.Ct., at 2026; Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2454. 
41
 Roper, 543 U.S.at 570. 
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convicted of felony murder and whose intent to kill was not proven.42 Nonetheless, on my view, 
Miller is at least as powerful a statement about how juveniles should be dealt with in the justice 
system as the earlier opinions—and apparently the dissenting justices thought so as well.  
Miller is noteworthy in three ways that expand its importance beyond its narrow holding. 
First, the Court (gratuitously, a critic might say) emphasized that, while it was not categorically 
prohibiting LWOP as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, it expected the sentence to be 
“uncommon.”43 As Justice Roberts noted in dissent, “uncommon” sounds a lot like “unusual” in 
8th Amendment parlance- and he predicted that the next step would be a categorical bar.44   
Second, Miller follows Graham in making explicit that juveniles have a very special  
Eighth Amendment status. The Court has long adopted a two-track approach to reviewing the 
constitutionality of criminal sentences under the 8th Amendment. The mantra “Death is different” 
captures the distinction; the Court has applied rigorous proportionality review to the death 
penalty45 but has been extremely reluctant to override non-capital sentencing decisions (no 
                                                 
42
 Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2468. Jackson was not the gunman in the convenience store hold up that resulted in the death 
of the clerk; indeed he was outside for much of the crime; and there was no evidence that he intended to kill the 
victim. Justice Breyer would have prohibited LWOP without such evidence, Id. at 2476, but the majority, although it 
noted Jackson’s diminished capacity, did not agree. 
43
 Id. at 2469.  
44
 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts speculates, “the Court's gratuitous prediction [that LWOP for juveniles should 
be uncommon] appears to be nothing other than an invitation to overturn life without parole sentences...” Id. at 2481 
(dissenting opinion). 
45
 The Court has prohibited the imposition of the death penalty for offenses other than intentional killing, and for 
certain categories of offenders, such as mentally retarded offenders and juveniles. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death penalty was grossly disproportionate to the crime of rape); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally retarded individuals violates the 8th amendment); 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that the 8th  amendment prohibits the death penalty as 
punishment for the rape of a child; Enmund v. Florida, 458 US 782 (1982) (holding that the 8th amendment does not 
permit the death penalty for a defendant who aids or abets a felony that results in a murder by others, when the 
defendant did not intend or attempt the murder himself). See also, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (prohibiting mandatory imposition of death penalty and requiring that defendant be evaluated 
individually, including evaluating mitigating factors). 
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matter how draconian) for adults.46 Graham and Miller afford juveniles facing LWOP 
protections that for adults are available only in the death penalty context—the requirement of 
individualized sentencing47 and the categorical exclusion of the sentence as excessive for certain 
crimes.48 The Court actually made the link explicit, comparing LWOP for juveniles to a death 
sentence.49 Indeed, Justice Kagan’s already famous words-- “If death is different, children are 
different.” announced a new principle with implications that potentially reach far beyond 
LWOP.50 
The third noteworthy aspect of Miller reinforces this principle. The Court insisted that the 
distinctive features of adolescence that reduce youthful culpability are not crime specific- they 
are as relevant to homicide as to non-homicide offenses.51 Implicit in this generalization of the 
Court’s proportionality analysis- is a broader principle that the same features of adolescence that 
mitigate the culpability of youths sentenced to LWOP reduce the blameworthiness of juveniles’ 
criminal choices generally. Justice Roberts lamented in dissent that there was “No clear reason 
that [Miller’s] principle would not bar all mandatory sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile 
sentence as harsh as what a similarly situated adult would receive.”52  
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 In evaluating whether non-capital adult sentences are excessive, the Court has required “gross disproportionality”, 
a standard adopted from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality 
opinion). See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (“The proportionality principles in our cases 
distilled in Justice Kennedy's concurrence guide our application of the Eighth Amendment...”). The gross 
disproportionality standard is rarely met. See e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 ( life sentence for third felony (theft of a 
golf club) not grossly disproportionate); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (denial of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus while upholding a life sentence for three petty thefts, the 3rd of which was the theft of video tapes 
worth $70). 
47
 The Court before Miller held that the prohibition of a mandatory sentence only applied to the death penalty and 
not to non-capital sentences. See Harmelin at 1006.   
48
 See note 45 supra.  
49
 The Court emphasized that  LWOP “shares some characteristics with death sentences that are shared with no other 
sentences.” Miller,132 S. Ct., at 2464-66 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2027). 
50
 Miller, 132 S. Ct., at 2470. 
51
 Id. at 2465. 
52
 Id. at 2482 (Roberts, J., dissenting).   Justice Roberts also observed “[The] [p]rinciple behind today’s decision 
seems to be only that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently.” Id. 
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I think Justice Roberts is correct, although it seems unlikely that the Court will apply this 
principle as a constitutional constraint on sentencing juveniles as broadly as he fears. 
Nonetheless, the importance of these opinions is hard to exaggerate. It is true that they affect a 
relatively small number of offenders convicted of the most serious crimes. But following a long 
period in which the relevance to criminal punishment of differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders was either ignored or denied, our highest legal institution has emphatically rejected the 
view of young criminals that dominated in the 1990s. 
Juvenile Crime Regulation in the 21st century 
Although its opinions surely influence other lawmakers, the Supreme Court does not dictate 
most juvenile crime regulation. But changing attitudes toward young offenders have affected 
policymakers at all levels of government; across the country, there has been a rethinking of tough 
incarceration–based policies and a readiness to try different approaches. To be sure, many 
(probably most) statutes mandating or allowing the adult prosecution and punishment of 
juveniles are still in place.  But the recent legislative trend has been away from punitive laws. 
Some states have repealed mandatory transfer statutes and others have restricted the transfer of 
younger juveniles.53 Connecticut raised its general jurisdictional age from 16 to 18—following a 
campaign in which supporters emphasized the developmental immaturity of adolescents and the 
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 For example, in 2009, the state of Washington, as part of a broad reform moderating its approach to juvenile 
crime, repealed an automatic transfer statute enacted in 1994 and also prohibited transfer of youths under the age of 
15 except for murder or aggravated assault. Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 5746 (“ESSB 5746”), 61st Legislature, 
2009 Regular Session, passed April 22, 2009 available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2009-
10/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Passed%20Legislature/5746-S.PL.pdf. See also, note 31 supra (describing repeal of an 
Illinois statute that mandated adult prosecution of 15 year olds charged with selling drugs near a school or housing 
project, on the basis of evidence that most of those charged under the law were minority youths). 
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ineffectiveness of adult punishment in reducing recidivism.54 Even youths who are tried as adults 
are more likely to receive different treatment than a decade ago. A few states (most recently 
California in 2012) have abolished LWOP for juveniles altogether.55 In Colorado, repeal 
followed a series of sympathetic stories in the Rocky Mountain News; politicians pointed to 
adolescent brain research in explaining their support for the measure.56 Legislatures in other 
states have passed laws requiring an assessment of juveniles’ competence to stand trial, when 
they are adjudicated as adults--addressing concerns first raised by the Court in Graham that some 
youths may be unable to function effectively as defendants in criminal proceedings.57  As the 
differences between juveniles and adults have become more salient, lawmakers increasingly have 
paid attention to the values of procedural and substantive fairness.  
But in terms of impact, the reforms that many states have undertaken of their juvenile justice 
systems are just as important as restrictions on criminal prosecution and punishment. Several 
states, including California and New York, have dramatically reduced the number of youths 
confined to state institutions, shifting resources to community-based programs. California in 
2007 dismantled the California Youth Authority and closed most of its facilities.58 In New York, 
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 S.R. 1500, Gen. Ass., Je. Sp. Sess.(CT 2007, amending Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. Sect. 46b-120. See CONNECTICUT 
JUVENILE JURISDICTION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, 2-4 (2007) (legislative 
committee report citing research, including brain research on immaturity of juveniles and high recidivism rates of 
youths receiving adult sentences as basis of raising jurisdictional age from 16 to 18), available at 
www.housedems.ct.gov/jjpic/070212_JJPIC_report_revised_pdf. 
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 See Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, “SB 9 Is Signed into Law Giving Juveniles Serving Life-Without-Parole 
Sentences A Second Chance”, October 2012 at http://www.pjdc.org/2012/10/sb-9-is-signed-into-law-giving-
juveniles-serving-life-without-parole-sentences-a-second-chance/. 
56
 Miles Moffeit and Kevin Simpson, Research Points to Changing Teen Brain, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at A1; 
Miles Moffeit, Juvenile Justice Legislation a Milestone in Sentencing, DENVER POST May 28, 2006. 
See also Gwen Florio, Sue Lindsey, & Sarah Langbein, Life for Death: Should Teen Murderers get a Second 
Chance at Freedom?, ROCKY MTN NEWS, Sept. 17 2005, at 1A. Governor Bill Owen pointed to brain research in 
explaining his support.  
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 See, e.g., FLA. CODE ANN. SECT. 985.223(1)(F)(describing mental capacities to be addressed in evaluating 
juvenile’s competence); ARIZ. REV. STAT. SECT. 8-291.07(B)(1)-(4).  See also 2007 State Juvenile Justice 
Legislation, available at http://www.njdc.info.publications.php. 
58
 Pursuant largely to a 2007 statutory directive (SB 81 and AB 191), the state renamed the CYA the Division of 
Juvenile Justice (DYJ and directed that most convicted youths remain in their communities. 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Juvenile_Justice/DJJ_History/index.html. The DYJ census dropped by more than 80%. Id. 
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a Task Force appointed by Governor Patterson issued a scathing report in 2009 harshly 
criticizing the state’s juvenile system. The report noted that most youths placed in juvenile 
institutions, at a cost to taxpayers of  $210,000 a year, were misdemeanants—and that their 
recidivism rates were appallingly high- 75% reoffended within 3 years.59 The system’s punitive 
approach, the report stated, “damaged the future prospects of these young people, wasted 
millions of taxpayers’ dollars and violated the fundamental principles of positive youth 
development.”60 New York City officials responded by announcing a plan to drastically reduce 
the number of city youths sent to state institutions.61 Under the plan, most youths have remained 
in their homes, receiving therapeutic services that had been shown to reduce crime more 
effectively than institutional placement at a fraction of the cost.  
Other states have implemented policies aimed at deterring institutional placement and keeping 
youths in their communities.62 Several jurisdictions, including Ohio and Illinois, have reversed 
perverse financial incentives that previously encouraged judges to sentence youths to state 
facilities, allowing the locality to avoid the cost of dispositions.63 Other states such as Maryland 
have adopted strategic plans, redirecting funds from secure institutions to community programs. 
And many states have reformed residential placement itself, adapting a model developed in 
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 CHARTING A NEW COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE (2009) 
60
  Id. at 8. 
61
 Julie Bosnan, City Signals Intent to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html?ref=nyregion&pagewanted=print Id (describing a 
cost of $17,000 per youth ).   
62
 NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, BRINGING YOUTH HOME: A NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO INCREASE PUBLIC 
SAFETY, REHABILITATE YOTH AND SAVE MONEY (2011) [hereinafter BRINGING YOUTH HOME], available at 
http://www.njjn.org/library/search-results?subject=8 (describing the move to community based sanctions in various 
states). 
63
 Id.  
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Missouri that rejects prison-like institutions in favor of small therapeutic facilities near 
offenders’ homes. 64   
Foundations have been important catalysts for 21st century reform, working with states and 
localities to change juvenile crime policy. The MacArthur Foundation with its longstanding 
commitment to bringing a developmental approach to juvenile crime regulation, has pursued its 
ambitious Models for Change program in a number of states.65 The Annie E Casey Foundation 
has reformed juvenile detention practices across the country through its JDAI program that aims 
to reduce racial disparity in detention and restrict it to those youths who represent a substantial 
risk.66 
As I have suggested, these reforms were motivated by a mix of factors—and the goals of 
cutting costs and saving state resources are high on the list. But policymakers are also coming to 
recognize that locking kids up may not be the best way to reduce crime. This is not surprising 
given what we know about the important role of social context in adolescent development.67 As 
the work of Donna Bishop and other has shown, adult prisons and institutional facilities are 
                                                 
64See MO. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVICES, DIV. OF YOUTH SERVICES, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2006, 
available at www.dss.mo.gov/re/pdf/dys/dysfy06.pdf.  Recidivism rates are reported to be far lower than the rates of 
youths coming out of institutional placement.  Id. (reporting recidivism rates of 8.7%). See Marian Wright Edelman, 
Juvenile Justice Reform: Making the “Missouri Model” an American Model, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 21, 2010, 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marian-wright-edelman/juvenile-justice-reform-m_b_498976.html 
(advocating a nationwide shift to the Missouri Model). 
65The Foundation, in collaboration with other funders, sponsored empirical research on dimensions of adolescent 
development relevant to criminal activity and to the adjudication of youths for their offenses. For general 
information, see www.adjj.org.  The Models for Change program, the centerpiece of The Foundation’s recent 
juvenile justice efforts, is a collaboration between the foundation and  targeted states to implement fairer and more 
developmentally conscious juvenile justice models. See http://www.modelsforchange.net/index.html.  
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 See generally  http://www.aecf.org/MajorInitiatives/JuvenileDetentionAlternativesInitiative.aspx. 
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 Several environmental conditions provide the “opportunity structures” and conditions necessary for healthy 
psychological development– the presence of an authoritative adult parent figure; association with pro-social peers; 
and participation in educational and other activities that facilitate the development of autonomous decision-making 
and critical thinking skills. See He Len Chung, Michelle Little, & Laurence Steinberg, The Transition to Adulthood 
for Adolescents in the Juvenile Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, in ON YOUR OWN WITHOUT A NET: 
THE TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD FOR VULNERABLE POPULATIONS (Wayne Osgood, Michael Foster, Constance 
Flanagan, & Gretchen Ruth eds., 2005). 
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harmful developmental settings;68 and long incarceration undermines the opportunities for 
delinquent youths to mature into productive adults. Against the backdrop of developmental 
knowledge, the high recidivism rates of youths released from these facilities is not surprising. 
States increasingly have embraced the view that public safety is often promoted by addressing 
the needs of young offenders through scientifically based rehabilitative services near offenders’ 
homes.69 
This more pragmatic approach to youth crime regulation has been possible, in part, because 
teenage crime has not been a pressing social concern—other threats (such as terrorism and the 
economy) have become more urgent. Under these conditions, policymakers have been more 
inclined to deliberate on the long term costs and benefits of various policies and to focus on 
values such as fairness and racial justice—considerations that got little attention in the late 20th 
century. In combination, the promise of cost savings, crime reduction and better long term 
outcomes for youths have led many states to substantially revise their juvenile justice policies to 
incorporate the lessons of modern developmental science. Interestingly, contemporary 
knowledge has contributed to a revival of the principle that animated the traditional juvenile 
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 Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
227 (JEFFREY FAGAN & FRANK ZIMRING EDS., 2000). The deficiencies of institutional settings (especially prison) 
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repeatedly over a twenty year period. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 215-21 (describing effective programs 
using this approach). 
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court-- that young offenders are different from their adult counterparts and should be dealt with 
differently when they commit crime. 
Forestalling Future Moral Panics.   
This account of the evolution of youth crime regulation over the past generation seems like a  
story with a happy ending—one in which the lawmakers have accepted the lessons of 
developmental science and henceforth will regulate juvenile crime in ways that reduce its social 
cost are also fairer to young offenders. There is a lot to like in this story. But unfortunately, I 
need to interject a note of realism; there is little reason to be confident that the relatively benign 
attitudes supporting the current sensible policies will persist. The forces that triggered public 
fears in the 1990s are likely to be activated again at some point—resulting in new moral panics 
directed at young criminals, predictably leading to new punitive law reforms. So the question I 
would like to address in conclusion is whether there is anything we could do to reinforce the 
current legal trend. I think the answer is “possibly”—lawmakers may be able to adopt what 
might be called precommitment strategies to deter future moral panics or at least reduce their 
cost.  
The problem with decisionmaking during a moral panic is that it is driven by pressing 
immediate concerns-- punishing criminals, protecting the public, and avenging victims. In a 
climate of fear and anger, distorted perceptions of the threat result in precipitous decisions-- 
while long term goals or interests that (in the abstract) most would acknowledge are as (or more) 
important—tend to be ignored or discounted. So in the rush to protect the public from juvenile 
crime in the 1990s, little attention was paid to the financial cost of the punitive reforms, their 
fairness, their impact on young offenders’ lives--  or even whether they were effective at 
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reducing crime (except in the most immediate sense).  In calmer times, deliberation is possible 
and government officials are more likely to consider these long term goals and concerns in 
making decisions. And, essentially, that is what has happened. To the extent that there has been a 
policy shift in recent years, it is because these broader considerations have been weighed in the 
calculus—something that didn’t happen in the 1990s.   
So what is the remedy for the moral panic problem? Here I turn to decision theory and research 
which provides a framework for thinking about the problem that we face in juvenile justice 
policy – and suggests that it is not uncommon in human experience. In many domains, 
individuals are sometimes tempted to make decisions based on compelling but transitory 
preferences, while discounting stable long term goals and future consequences.70 (The dieter who 
reaches for a piece of chocolate cake is a good example from everyday life). But decision theory 
also suggests that individuals and lawmakers can employ corrective strategies to assist them in 
adhering to their long term interests and goals.71 In our context, lawmakers acting during a 
period when deliberation is possible can adopt policies that could promote better decisionmaking 
in the future by avoiding ill-advised actions and by incorporating consideration of long term 
interests into the regulatory process.  
 Restricting Prosecutors and Judges 
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 The problem of inconsistent choice over time was first identified by R.H. Strotz, “Myopia and Inconsistency in 
Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1955-56). The problem is analyzed from multiple 
perspectives in GEORGE LOWENSTEIN AND JON ELSTER, EDS., CHOICE OVER TIME (1992).   
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 Political economist Thomas Schelling has explored numerous situations from everyday life in which individuals 
use precommitment strategies to adhere to their long term goals. See THOMAS SCHELLING, CHOICE AND 
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First, prosecutors (particularly) but also judges are front line decisionmakers, and simply by 
virtue of their roles in the justice system, are most subject to pressure to respond to the criminal 
acts of teenagers on the basis of immediate concerns- punishing the criminal and assuaging angry 
victims and the public. Clear statutory directives allowing criminal court prosecution only when 
fairness and social welfare goals support it can insulate these officials from these pressures. 
Removing prosecutors’ authority to make jurisdictional decisions72 and limiting transfer 
eligibility to older juveniles charged with serious violent felonies73 would go some distance 
toward achieving this goal.  
 Legislative Precommitments  
Precommitments that restrict and guide future legislative decisions are trickier—since a future 
legislature can always repeal any statutory restraint. But in other areas, lawmakers have adopted 
legislative strategies to promote deliberation, focus decisionmaking on policy goals and monitor 
legislative actions for consistency with these goals—and generally they have not been inclined to 
repeal constraints when they are inconvenient.74 Some such mechanisms could be adapted to the 
context of juvenile crime regulation. 
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 This would include repealing direct-file statutes, but also automatic transfer laws, under which prosecutors can 
choose whether to charge youths with a transferrable offense or with a less serious crime that will be adjudicated in 
juvenile court. National Center for Juvenile Justice, National Overviews, available at http:www.ncjj.org; Patricia 
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First, legislatures can enact a version of what William Eskridge and John Ferejohn call  “super- 
statutes”75—in this case, a comprehensive statute setting in place substantive juvenile crime 
policies—and announcing the principles, goals and guidelines to direct lawmakers in the future.  
In other substantive areas, lawmakers have shaped the future direction of policy through such 
statutes. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for example, establishes broad 
environmental goals and policies, and institutes procedures to promote adherence to these 
policies.76 Similarly, a comprehensive juvenile justice statute can establish scientifically- based 
policies that further the substantive goals of recidivism reduction, cost effectiveness and public 
protection, as well as fairness and proportionality, together with procedural requirements that 
maximize the likelihood that future regulation will conform to these goals and principles. 
What procedural requirements can encourage future lawmakers to adhere to (or at least be 
aware of) long term goals?  Two possibilities are cost-benefit analysis and impact statements. In 
other legal settings, government agencies are sometimes required to undertake cost-benefit 
analyses to encourage consideration of the predicted financial costs over time of a proposed 
regulatory change.77 This practice could be beneficial in the context of juvenile crime regulation 
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as well. As we have seen, legislatures rushing to enact laws in the midst of moral panics seldom 
considered their long term budgetary impact. This problem can be mitigated if cost benefit 
analysis is built into the legislative and regulatory process. 
 Another procedural mechanism that could improve deliberation in the lawmaking process is 
the requirement of an impact statement. Under NEPA, an environmental impact statement is 
required when proposed government action is likely to have substantial consequences for the 
environment.78 Closer to our context, some states require legislatures and agencies to prepare 
racial impact statements when considering changes to sentencing and other criminal justice 
policies.79 These requirements amount to mandates that lawmakers weigh (or at least be aware 
of) long term considerations that they otherwise may tend to discount in making regulatory 
decisions. A juvenile justice impact statement could improve regulatory decisionmaking by 
focusing on long term consequences that otherwise might be ignored, including the likely effect 
of the proposed legal change on incarceration rates and duration, recidivism rates, racial 
disparity, and on the future educational and employment opportunities of the youths affected by 
the law. 
Finally it is realistic to assume that despite the adoption of precommitment mechanisms,  
legislatures will sometimes enact ill-considered laws in response to public fears about teenage 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regulatory Review, 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011), press release available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
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http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/rd_abaarticle.pdf.(describing adoption of requirement and benefits of impact 
statements).  
 
24 
 
crime. But the cost of such lapses can be contained through oversight by a standing law revision 
commission, appointed by the legislature to review juvenile crime regulation periodically to 
evaluate conformity to established principles and goals. In the United Kingdom and in several 
American states, independent law commissions review different areas of law and propose 
legislative reform when laws are outdated, inconsistent with contemporary policies, or otherwise 
problematic.80  The evidence indicates that these bodies have been remarkably effective; most 
reforms proposed by standing law commissions have been adopted.81  In the context of juvenile 
crime regulation, an independent legislatively- appointed commission can perform an important 
monitoring function, serving as a safeguard when the social costs of laws enacted during periods 
of moral panic later become evident. During calmer periods, legislatures may be open to taking 
corrective action in response to law commission recommendations.  
As I have described the proposed precommitment framework, you may have been asking 
yourself “Why would any politician support restrictions on their ability to act quickly in response 
to urgent public concerns about juvenile crime in the future?” It is a good question and I may not 
have a completely satisfactory answer. Even though most of the framework has been 
implemented in other legal settings, the politics of crime is different from environmental 
politics—and politicians may think that the public will be outraged if the government seems 
insufficiently responsive to a school shooting or gang killing.   
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 The U.K. commission, created as an independent body by Parliament in 1965, consists of 5 members who serve 
full time;the chair must be an appellate judge.  http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/about/who-we-are.htm. 
Statutorily created commissions have played important roles in proposing legislative reform in New York and 
California. See http://www.lawrevision.state.ny.us/ (describing purpose of N.Y. commission’s review and reform 
purposes). See also http://www.clrc.ca.gov/. 
81
 More than 2\3 of the U.K. commission’s proposed law reforms are enacted or accepted by the government. 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/about/381.htm. Over 90% of California’s Law Revision Commission’s  
recommendations have been enacted into law, affecting more than 22,500 sections of the California statutory codes. 
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/. 
25 
 
These are legitimate concerns, but my, perhaps optimistic, view is that public opinion may 
represent a less formidable obstacle to reform than politicians assume. Substantial evidence 
indicates that although the public cares about protection from violent crime, it also endorses a 
rehabilitative approach for juvenile offenders.82  The view that adolescents are different from 
adult criminals may be forgotten during a moral panic, but recent history shows that the demands 
for harsh punishment are likely to fade over time, and paternalistic (and pragmatic) attitudes 
toward youth reemerge. Ultimately – in calmer periods—the public realizes it is in society’s 
interest to have both effective and fair juvenile crime regulation. This is more likely to be 
achieved by attending to the features of adolescence that distinguish teenage criminal activity. 
 *   *   * 
   
This symposium has been convened at an exciting time in the history of juvenile justice 
policy—one in which we have a window of opportunity for a new wave of law reform. So it may 
seem like the wrong time to be looking back at the bad old days. But in my view, our best hope 
of sustaining our current policy direction and of reinforcing the perspective on adolescent 
offending endorsed by the Supreme Court is to think about how to avoid returning to a period in 
a lot of harm was done by (mostly) well-meaning officials who thought they were effectively 
combating youth crime. 
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